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1Adaptive Activism
Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Case of North Korea
Danielle Chubb and Andrew Yeo
The international community must accept its responsibility to protect the people of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crimes against humanity, because the
Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has manifestly failed to
do so.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea1
On March 21, 2013, the United Nations Human Rights Council established
the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK). The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights (COI) was tasked to investigate “the systematic, widespread and grave
violations of human rights in the DPRK, with a view to ensuring full
accountability.”2 One year later, the COI released its report. In a powerful
statement, the Chair of the Commission declared that “the gravity, scale,
duration and nature of the unspeakable atrocities committed in the country
reveal a totalitarian state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary
world.”3 The report found that these human rights violations “arise from
policies at the highest level of the State” and amount to “ongoing crimes
1 UN Human Rights Council 2014, sect. V.
2 These findings include, but are not limited to: violations of the freedoms of thought, expres-
sion, and religion (where the state claims “an absolute monopoly over information and total
control of organized social life”); violations of the right to food, stemming largely from
discrimination, state restrictions on food aid delivery, and prioritization of resources toward
military spending even in times of mass starvation; and arbitrary detention, torture, and
execution, with people found guilty of political crimes “disappeared” into political prison
camps where “the inmate population has been gradually eliminated through deliberate
starvation, forced labor, executions, torture, rape and the denial of reproductive rights.” For
the complete findings, see UN Human Rights Council 2014.
3 UN Human Rights Council 2014.
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against humanity . . . which our generation must tackle urgently and
collectively.”4
The COI’s report, released in March 2014, marked an important juncture
for North Korean human rights advocacy and represented the culmination of
years of dedicated transnational advocacy on behalf of North Korean human
rights. The most immediate effect of the COI report was the profile it gave the
issue of North Korean human rights. Once a subject relegated to the sidelines
and considered secondary to the important statecraft of security and nuclear
diplomacy, the human rights situation in North Korea was broadcast to the
world. There is now little doubt remaining as to the legitimacy of the claim
that horrific violations take place inside the country on a daily basis.
While much has been revealed about human rights in North Korea, far less
has been said about the advocacy networks that drew attention to the issue and
helped bring about the COI in the first place. The COI report, which for the
first time documented the full litany of human rights abuses carried out by the
North Korean regime against its own people, was made possible on the back of
decades of advocacy and research undertaken by a global network of dedicated
human rights actors. The success these nonstate actors have had in raising this
issue at the highest level of the United Nations (UN) is surprising because it
has occurred without direct access to the North Korean state. As we discuss in
this chapter, current scholarly models of how transnational activism works
assume the existence of at least some local opposition movements working
inside the country. Yet the North Korea case suggests that this is not, in fact,
a necessary scope condition. Moving forward, current research into human
rights change also points to the conclusion that local actors are necessary for
lasting human rights change, but assumes that change is top down (that is, that
change happens when states are responsive to international and domestic
pressure). Yet despite the absence of domestic actors, North Korean human
rights activists continue to pursue better outcomes in North Korea, and not
always in the “top down” way we might expect. These observations thus raise
two questions which animate this opening chapter, and indeed the other
contributions in this volume. First, how does a transnational advocacy network
emerge to push for change in a highly repressive context where there is no
domestic opposition? And second, by what pathways might transnational
activists create change in such contexts?
This volume turns the spotlight onto the work of those actors who have
worked tirelessly to expose the human rights situation in North Korea. Human
rights actors within the North Korean transnational advocacy network include
4 Kirby 2014.
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domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergo-
vernmental organizations (IGOs), government agencies, legislative bodies,
foundations, think-tanks, churches and other religious organizations, journalists,
scholars, students, and concerned citizens. The network therefore comprises
individuals as well as organizations and coalitionmovements, which “form links
across actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations, [multi-
plying] the channels of access to the international system.”5 Table 1.1 provides
a small sample of actors within the North Korean human rights network.6
In this chapter, we explore the ways in which the case of North Korean
human rights activism both confirms and challenges existing scholarship on
transnational human rights activism, and the role advocacy networks play in
the diffusion of human rights norms, discourse, and practice. In particular, we
draw attention to the weaknesses with current models of human rights change
and examine how state and nonstate actors challenge highly repressive
regimes by investigating the quintessential “hard case” of North Korea.
We proceed by first offering a brief review of existing models of transnational
advocacy networks and human rights change and review their applicability to
the task of understanding North Korean human rights advocacy. We then
extrapolate three variables that we argue are critical to understanding the
emergence and evolution of North Korean human rights activism: discourse,
network dynamics, and defectors. Finally, we turn our attention to human
rights outcomes, exploring the different mechanisms of change that link
activism to outcomes. We conclude by recapping our theoretical aims and
outlining what is to follow in the remaining chapters of this volume.
TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS, DOMESTIC OPPOSITION,
AND THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA
Since the late 1990s, a large body of scholarship has explored the role played by
transnational advocacy networks in world politics.7 Taken as a whole, this
literature has been instrumental in documenting the ways in which nonstate
actors have transformed outcomes on the world stage by wielding significant
moral and ideational power. In bringing about new normative frameworks, as
5 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1.
6 Table 1.1 only represents organizations working specifically on “human rights issues,” defined
in terms of civil and political rights. When using a broader definition to include social and
economic rights, other contributors also consider that humanitarian organizations fall under
the scope of human rights. For example, see Chapter 2 by Reidhead.
7 See, for example, Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Della Porta and
Tarrow 2005; Busby 2010; Hadden 2015; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; 2013.
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well as compelling adherence (behavioral changes) to international human
rights norms, the outcomes achieved by the principled actors that make up
these advocacy networks have been heralded as evidence that neither states
nor nonstate actors simply act out of strategically determined self-interest, but
that ideas and values matter in world politics.8
table 1.1. Sample of North Korean human rights organizational actors by country
Actor Country
Free NK Radio South Korea (defector-led)
North Korea Freedom Coalition USA
The Committee for Human Rights in North
Korea (HRNK)
USA
North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity South Korea (defector-led)
PSCORE (People for Successful Corean
Reunification)
South Korea
Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) USA
Helping Hands Korea South Korea
Justice for North Korea South Korea
Life Funds for North Korean Refugees Japan
The Council for Human Rights in North Korea
(Canada)
Canada
North Korea Strategy Center South Korea (defector-led)
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human
Rights
South Korea
Network for North Korean Democracy and
Human Rights
South Korea
Database Center for North Korean Human
Rights
South Korea
European Alliance for Human Rights in North
Korea
United Kingdom
All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea United Kingdom
International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against
Humanity in North Korea
South Korea / Transnational
Amnesty International United Kingdom (Global)
Human Rights Watch
United Nations Human Rights Council United Nations (Global)
National Endowment for Democracy USA
Radio Free Asia USA
8 These conceptual claims can be found in the work of scholars from the same period. See, for
example, Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998; Price and Tannenwald 1996.
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Keck and Sikkink’s Activists Beyond Borders is often taken as the launching
point for any discussion on transnational advocacy networks.9 Although the
idea of “networks” is what draws many scholars to Keck and Sikkink’s seminal
work, their emphasis on “advocacy” is also of great relevance to the contribu-
tions in this volume. As Keck and Sikkink state, “advocacy captures what is
unique about these transnational networks: they are organized to promote
causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they involve individuals advocating
policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of
their ‘interests.’”10 Thus, the authors expose how transnational advocacy net-
works strategically wield resources and influence to transcend their material
disadvantage vis-a`-vis states and shift prevailing “structures of power and
meaning.”11
Perhaps Keck and Sikkink’s most influential contribution to the study of
transnational advocacy networks is the “boomerang pattern” of information
flow and international pressure directed against a rights-violating regime.
When opportunities between the state and domestic actors are blocked, and
local activists and NGOs are thus unable to place direct pressure on their own
governments, they reach out to international allies for support. These allies –
be they international NGOs (INGOs), UN groups, other states, single-issue
rights organizations, or individual actors – then work to raise global awareness
and apply political leverage and outside pressure against the repressive, rights-
violating state.12 Beyond the boomerang pattern, Risse and Sikkink present
a more dynamic “spiral model” of human rights change.13 This model, which
we discuss in more detail in this chapter’s final section on compliance issues,
seeks to understand the broader processes of normative diffusion. Like the
boomerang pattern, the spiral model places domestic activists at its center.14
On the surface, certain aspects of the boomerang pattern do bear out in the
North Korean case, even in the absence of local dissident voices.
Transnational advocacy networks have played a critical role in
raising awareness, advocating, and lobbying on behalf of North Koreans who
remain mostly powerless against a totalitarian state. As contributors to this
volume describe (see chapters by Yeo [3], Arrington [4], Narayan [5], Hosaniak
[6], and Chubb [8]), the North Korean human rights network has gained the
support of significant actors, including the UN and the European Union
9 Keck and Sikkink 1998. We use other terms, including transnational movement, transnational
advocacy group, or international campaign in reference to North Korean human rights
activism. However, our thinking on activism in this volume resonates most closely with the
transnational advocacy network concept.
10 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8–9. 11 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 23–5. See also Price 2003, 583.
12 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12–13. 13 Risse and Sikkink 1999. 14 Risse and Sikkink 1999, 5.
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(EU); powerful states, such as the United States; and major NGOs, such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
While some aspects of North Korean human rights activism appear to
conform to existing models of transnational networks and human rights
change, other attributes of the North Korean case suggest it is an outlier.
First, no civil society or domestic opposition exists in North Korea.15 Both the
boomerang pattern and the spiral model take domestic (or local) civil society
as their starting points for transnational advocacy and human rights change.
Yet even without local advocates, the North Korean human rights campaign
has still achieved some success. How did this happen, and what does this tell
us about the limitations of existing theory? To what degree do the models
described above help us understand the North Korean human rights case?
A core assumption is that a transnational network is activated (or at least
enabled) by local actors providing vital information and legitimacy to actors
outside the state. Domestic actors provide first-hand accounts and informa-
tion about human rights violations. They alert transnational actors to the
existence of abuse or strengthen and establish existing concerns. This, in
turn, bolsters the legitimacy of the claims of the transnational network,
rendering their advocacy more effective.16 In what ways, then, is the North
Korean human rights case an outlier, requiring a modification of these
models for highly repressive contexts, where it is difficult to gain verifiable
information about human rights abuses and where local populations can
neither challenge their own governments nor interact directly with the out-
side world?
Given that the dominant frameworks for human rights advocacy presuppose
that local human rights activists (that is, grassroots movements inside the
repressive state) play a legitimating role at the earliest stages of the model,
how do we then account for the widespread acceptance of the claims made by
North Korean human rights activists in the absence of any such locally based
dissident actors? The argument that networks create a “transnational struc-
ture” for challenging norm-violating regimes from below and above, and
“empower and legitimate”17 the claims of local activists against their own
repressive regimes, appears less relevant in the North Korean context in the
absence of any localized North Korean civil society. Yet, despite their absence,
the transnational campaign has experienced impressive mobilizing capacity
15 While there are reports of North Koreans who privately criticize or speak ill of the regime,
there is no evidence of mobilization or sustained collective action in North Korea. See also Joo
2014; Armstrong 2003; Tudor and Pearson 2015.
16 Risse and Sikkink 1999, 20. 17 Risse and Sikkink 1999, 5.
6 Danielle Chubb and Andrew Yeo
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108589543.003
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Deakin University, Australia (Books), on 01 Nov 2018 at 04:26:57, subject to the Cambridge
and a series of significant legislative outcomes at the domestic and interna-
tional levels.
Second, and related to the above, the level of repression in North Korea is
virtually unparalleled in the contemporary world.18While other studies exam-
ine the validity of the spiral model in highly repressive contexts, very few of
them address a state like North Korea where the local population remains
completely isolated from the outside world.19 Schwarz goes so far as to argue
that in repressive, totalitarian settings where citizens are not granted political
rights, there is little value to be gained from using models of human rights
change: “the analysis of totalitarian regimes seems to offer little benefit since
by definition little or no respect for human rights can be expected.”20
As Jetschke and Liese discuss in their review of the original spiral model, in
cases of severe repression, authoritarian governments have proven successful
in limiting the opening of domestic opportunity structures and preventing the
strengthening of networks between domestic and transnational civil society.21
As such, this is a quintessential “hard case” test of the spiral model.
In the wake of severe repression and the absence of any visible civil society,
the evidence offered by contributors to this volume, and outlined further in
this chapter’s next section, reveals that the North Korean defector-activist
community serves as a conduit for local opposition, even if it does not directly
challenge the regime from within. It is through their work with North Korean
defectors that transnational activists have managed to build a convincing case.
As Hosaniak discusses in Chapter 6, the decision of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, an important gatekeeper of human rights
legitimacy, to take up the claims of the North Korean human rights movement
came about as a direct result of the High Commissioner’s meeting with former
North Korean political prisoners.
In short, existing theoretical frameworks do help illustrate the trajectory of
North Korean human rights advocacy today and the degree to which activists
have been effective in both gaining international attention for their issue and
promoting change. However, the North Korean case also reveals important
theoretical and empirical limitations to our current understanding of how
transnational human rights actors secure legitimacy in cases where the rights-
18 Freedom House, which evaluates the degree of civil and political liberties of each country
globally, has placed North Korea in its “worst of the worst” category for 44 consecutive years.
In 2017, only Syria scored lower than North Korea. See Shim 2017.
19 Such studies include Saudi Arabia. See Alhargan 2012; Fleay 2006; Stachursky 2013. Jetschke
and Liese provide amore comprehensive list and a discussion of case studies that have adopted
the spiral model. See Jetschke and Liese 2013, 28–31.
20 Schwarz 2004, 205. 21 Jetschke and Liese 2013, 30.
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violating actor is a closed, totalitarian state which has successfully sealed off its
domestic population from the rest of the world.
DISCOURSE, NETWORK DYNAMICS, AND DEFECTORS
Three variables are central to the application of our conceptual model of
change, and each of these helps shed further light on important elements of
the North Korean human rights advocacy network. A deeper understanding of
discourse, network dynamics, and defector voices helps elucidate how trans-
national human rights networks emerge and seek to bring about change in the
context of a “hard case” authoritarian state such as North Korea.
Discourse
A central claim of this volume is that activists’ interpretations of their norma-
tive commitments – as reflected in their discursive frames – carry conse-
quences for advocacy movements in terms of strategies, agendas, and
outcomes. The chapters in this volume, therefore, focus on the discourse of
North Korean human rights actors. By discourse, we mean the words, lan-
guage, statements, and debates which appear in speech or text form from
nonstate and state actors. Discursive frames refer to the ideas, principles, and
norms that inform discourses.22This focus enables us to examine the dynamics
of the network, including its fragmented nature, at both the domestic and
transnational level. It also allows us to better understand the role that defector
voices have played in the evolution of the movement.
To casual observers, principled actors within the North Korean human
rights advocacy network appear aligned to a common cause: ending human
rights abuses in North Korea. While this assumption is true at a basic level, it
belies the diversity of activists involved in the movement and fails to take into
account the politicized nature of discourse over North Korean human rights.
Network activists advocating on behalf of North Korean human rights fall
across a broad political spectrum and pursue diverse outcomes ranging from
bringing about human rights-compliant behavior in the repressive state to
provoking regime change or collapse. By exploring the varieties of discursive
frames that activists deploy, as well as the relationship between such discursive
frames, transnational mobilization, and human rights advocacy outcomes, the
22 We assume that these are context-specific and, across this volume, vary with respect to
domestic or transnational settings. The importance of context has been recognized in work
on ideas and discourse and is further explored in Chapter 3. See also Schmidt 2008.
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chapters in this volume are able to assess with greater rigor several important
issues surrounding North Korean human rights advocacy. These include:
network membership and the different coalitions and cleavages that emerge
within and between domestic and transnational networks; the ways in which
different human rights actors define and interpret their normative commit-
ments, and how this has led to a high degree of contestation within the
movement; the range of policy pathways and strategies promoted by diverse
actors vying for prominence within the network; and, finally, the variation in
state responses to North Korean human rights activism, including that of
North Korea, over time and in different national settings.23
How activists and policy officials talk about North Korean human rights is
often embedded in different domestic political contexts. As such, one is able to
follow the evolution of North Korean human rights activism and the rise of
transnational advocacy networks by tracing different discursive debates
concerning human rights across time and geographic space and piecing
them together. Through discourse, we uncover how the issue of North
Korean human rights has been contested, debated, and politicized by state
and nonstate actors alike. For instance, in Chapter 3, Yeo examines how the
unfolding of human rights debates in US foreign policy strongly influenced
the direction of North Korean human rights activism and the security framing
of human rights in the United States. This contrasts with North Korean
human rights activism in Japan and the centrality of the abductee issue in
that country’s discourse, as argued by Arrington in Chapter 4.24 A comparison
of North Korean human rights activism and discourse across different national
contexts thus highlights the multifaceted nature of human rights advocacy
across different polities.
The extent to which we find domestic differences in North Korean human
rights discourse leads to additional questions regarding the type of discourse
which emerges when activism shifts scale from the domestic to the
transnational realm. Do domestic advocacy groups adopt the language of the
broader transnational advocacy network, ultimately aligning or transforming
existing frames into a global frame by embracing the language of universal
rights, accountability, and compliance?25 Or do they manage to insert their
own particular domestic agenda into the broader transnational human rights
frame, thus influencing the agenda of North Korean human rights at the
23 On examining how rights movements emerge, contest, and frame their activist claims in
multilevel environments, see Ayoub and Chetaille 2017.
24 North Korean agents systematically kidnapped Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s.
25 On the transposition from domestic to global frames, see Tarrow 2005, 63. See also Benford
and Snow 2000; Della Porta 2007; Rothman and Oliver 2002; Yeo 2009.
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global level? Perhaps human rights actors simply wear two hats, employing
a domestically tailored frame and advocacy strategy in their home country on
the one hand, while uniting with global activists, NGOs, and IGOs and
adopting their movement frame when targeting North Korea at the UN on the
other.26 Such issues are taken up in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, where the contribu-
tors explore the transnational dimensions of North Korean human rights
activism.
Network Dynamics
Scholarship on transnational movements and agenda-setting has helped bring
greater nuance to our understanding of network dynamics.27 While existing
models of human rights change do recognize that transnational advocacy
networks are inherently conflictual, scholars have long believed that networks
provide the communicative environment in which participants can be
expected to “mutually transform.”28 Keck and Sikkink, for example, see
“frame disputes” among human rights activists as a powerful source of norma-
tive change within networks.29 Frame disputes certainly stimulate change
within networks in the North Korean human rights case, but they do so
often in the absence of any sort of mutual transformation. How, then, are
issues defined and agendas, strategies, and policy goals agreed upon? In the
case of North Korea, which is characterized by the absence of a local civil
society with which to consult on key issues around strategy and policy direc-
tion, these frame disputes are rendered even more complex. What action will
best bring about positive change for the North Korean people, ensuring their
dignity and improving their lives? Throughout this volume, network dynamics
are closely linked to discursive contestation. There is thus a close relationship
between these two variables. But by separating them, we are able to more
clearly identify the agential and structural forces at play when it comes to
normative contestation.
In the absence of any definitive voices from inside the country answering
questions such as these, it is unsurprising that there is a great deal of disagree-
ment between “human rights” and “humanitarianism” advocates as noted by
Reidhead in Chapter 2.30 But beyond this, human rights activists find them-
selves at odds over questions such as what the frame defining their advocacy
26 Tarrow 2005, 42–5.
27 On the role of network dynamics in agenda-setting, see Bob 2005; Hertel 2006; Carpenter 2014.
28 Keck and Sikkink 1999, 100; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 214. 29 Keck and Sikkink 1999, 92.
30 See also Yeo 2014.
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should be. While the COI seemed to come firmly down on the side of
“accountability” and pursuing greater compliance with international law
(see Goedde, Chapter 7), voices within the movement that see the North
Korean regime as incapable of change, and instead advocate the pursuit of
justice through policies of isolation, coercion, and change, have also played
a significant role in bringing the movement to where it is today (see Chapter 3
by Yeo and Chapter 8 by Chubb). We explore both sides of this human rights
narrative – and all the “sides” in between – in the chapters of this book, as these
are debates that vary from country to country, and are then amplified at the
transnational level.
The multivalent (a term used by Arrington in Chapter 4) nature of North
Korean human rights discourse is indicative of network dynamics. Scholars
including Carpenter, Bob, andHertel argue that “network dynamics” are a key
variable when it comes to issue-creation at the international level.31One of the
most striking characteristics of the North Korean human rights movement –
an observation carried in each one of this volume’s contributions – is the high
degree of normative contestation regarding movement principles and strategy
among groups and individuals.32 As discussed earlier, this is a fractured move-
ment, dealing with divisive issues around how to prioritize rights, pursue
desirable policy pathways, and appropriate advocacy strategies and tactics.
If discourse helps us uncover these differences, a focus on network dynamics
helps us understand the role such normative contestation plays in determining
movement agendas, strategies, and outcomes.
The chapters in this volume reveal that normative contestation has
a powerful effect on network outcomes at the level of agenda-setting.
The COI – a key moment in the movement’s history – has been celebrated
by a diverse set of actors across the North Korean human rights movement.
It represents, as Bob predicts, an “amalgam” of competing interpretations
31 Bob and Carpenter argue that the more powerful players within a given network play an
outsized, and sometimes problematic, role when it comes to shaping interpretations of human
rights. In contrast, Hertel’s work paints a more complicated picture, one in which normative
contestation can affect both norm evolution and policy outcomes, with less powerful actors
capable of bringing about incremental normative change, despite their lower profile. See Bob
2005; Carpenter 2014; Hertel 2006.
32 This is a form of normative contestation, by which we specifically refer to behavioral norms.
While the content of human rights norms is not contested (activists agree over the “rightness”
of human rights), we do find contestation over behavioral norms. We assume that this
contestation is generated by different principles regarding human rights action against
North Korea (how to best act so as to be doing good). In this volume, references to “normative
contestation” should be construed as referring to disputes over behavioral norms which may
present as a manifestation of differing normative agendas. For an in-depth discussion of the
differences between normative beliefs and behavioral norms, see Crawford 2002, 86–98.
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regarding how to affect human rights change inside North Korea.33 Based on
these insights, in Chapter 8 Chubb examines the incorporation of a wide
range of movement goals, some of them seemingly inchoate, in the COI’s
report. Goedde, in Chapter 7, also speaks to network dynamics as she con-
siders the implications of these competing normative and legal agendas for
bringing about behavioral change in North Korea.
A key question for scholars of transnational activism is whether actors
ultimately resolve normative contestation to make progress toward their stated
goals and agenda. The chapters in this book interrogate closely the various
ways in which normative contestation plays out among diverse actors within
the North Korean human rights network. In the volume’s Conclusion, how-
ever, we argue that normative contestation has not been an insurmountable
barrier to achievingmajor international exposure and legitimacy. As the North
Korean case demonstrates, human rights actors are simultaneously value-
driven and highly strategic. Hence, they are extremely adaptive, capable of
coordinating with coalition partners on elements of the campaign which
accord with their personal agendas and values. However, when necessary,
they also work separately to further their own agenda, whether that be naming-
and-shaming the regime, launching balloons with anti-North Korea leaflets
across the demilitarized zone from South Korea to North Korea, facilitating
information campaigns across the North Korean border, or seeking a more
bureaucratic approach to addressing human rights issues through the utiliza-
tion of transnational legal mechanisms.
Defector Voices
A final key element in understanding North Korean human rights activism is
the role of North Korean defectors in the human rights advocacy network.
These actors have played an increasing and instrumental role in the struggle
for North Korean human rights. Among the nearly 30,000 defectors who have
left North Korea and resettled elsewhere, a handful have organized to bear
witness and raise national and international awareness of ongoing human
rights abuses in their country of origin. These defectors have directly experi-
enced oppression in theNorth Korean system, and inmany cases are victims of
or witnesses to state violence.
In the absence of an active local civil society movement inside North
Korea, the inclusion of defector voices in the North Korean human rights
campaign has been both transformative and controversial. These voices
33 Bob 2009, 29.
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formed the core evidence sustaining the COI’s recommendation of referral
to the International Criminal Court. The testimonies (both on and off the
record) of these survivors and witnesses were crucial in the face of the refusal
of the North Korean government to allow the COI entry into North Korea.
Many of these testimonies took the form of public hearings, which
Commissioner Kirby argued was a decision made in the belief that it
“permits the international community to assess the witnesses and to make
their own assessments as to whether they are telling the truth.”34 At the same
time, critics have challenged the veracity of defector accounts, recommend-
ing caution when relying on testimonies which cannot always be indepen-
dently corroborated.35 This point was accentuated when the North Korean
government revealed inconsistencies in celebrity defector-activist Shin
Dong Hyuk’s account of his life inside the gulags, with Shin eventually
admitting to fabricating portions of his memoir.36
This volume documents the ways in which North Korean human rights
advocates have incorporated defectors’ voices into their campaign to add
legitimacy and credibility to their movement and to support the claim that
North Korea exists as one of the world’s worst human rights violators.
Conversely, outside support – whether in the form of funding from institu-
tions such as the National Endowment for Democracy or through network
resources from major human rights NGOs and UN organizations which
amplify defectors voices – is crucial to the survival of these defector
organizations. In this sense, none of the actors in the network are local
in the truest sense, and, instead, all of them act as “rooted cosmopolitans,”
mobilizing on behalf of issues and actors outside their places of origin and
building social networks to inhabit a transnational space.37 They have
what Della Porta and Tarrow call “multiple belongings and flexible
identities.”38 Yet defectors also fall outside this definition. Unlike their
fellow transnational activists, defector-activists never truly return to their
origins, and they are at the same time both external and domestic actors.
They are, in Tarrow’s formulation, truly “detached individuals,” and
necessarily transnational citizens.39
Ties between defectors and the broader advocacy network are mutually
beneficial, but as with all NGO dynamics, they also carry potential
principle–agent problems in which defector groups become co-opted and
34 McDonald 2014.
35 Jolley 2014. For a scholarly critique of the role of defectors in the North Korean human rights
movement, see Hong 2013; Song and Hong 2014.
36 Harden 2012. For other issues regarding defector accounts, see Song 2015.
37 Tarrow 2005, 40–3. 38 Della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 238. 39 Tarrow 2005, 43.
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beholden to the agenda of larger organizations.40 Generally speaking, the
participation of the diaspora or exiled dissident communities in human rights
campaigns is not unusual.41 However, North Korea may be one of the few
cases – if not the only case – where no organized activism exists inside the
regime-violating state. North Korean defectors, therefore, play a unique role in
the transnational advocacy campaign.
FROM DENIAL TO COMMITMENT AND BEYOND
The spiral model outlines a five-stage process describing how repressive
regimes gradually shift their behavior from that of a human rights norms
violator to that of a norms-compliant actor.42 Beginning with a repression
stage, a norm-violating state such as North Korea may express denial when
first confronted by transnational advocacy networks with accusations of
human rights violations. As pressure mounts from without and within, the
regime may offer tactical concessions resulting in minor policy shifts or
rhetorical commitments. For instance, the regime may release a few political
prisoners, permit greater political movement, or offer statements indicating its
support for international human rights. In this context, domestic actors are
mobilized and protected by growing transnational linkages. Over time,
a regime may grant human rights prescriptive status, further validating the
claims of domestic actors. States begin to change domestic laws in line with
human rights norms, ratify international human rights conventions and trea-
ties, and, more generally, incorporate human rights norms and practices
within domestic institutions and legal frameworks. The creation of the new
political space that enables these changes is the direct result either of signifi-
cant policy change on the part of the state or of regime change. The final phase
is rule-consistent behavior resulting in a behavioral change compliant with
international human rights.
The authors are clear that the spiral model does not assume a linear
trajectory toward human rights change. States may revert back to abusive
40 On the principle–agent problem with NGOs, see Cooley and Ron 2002. For more critical
views, see Song and Hong’s study, which argues that the National Endowment for
Democracy’s “‘human rights’ work is part of a much larger strategy of destabilizing the
North Korean government in line with US interventionist aims against its foes.” As the authors
write, “Central to the NED-financed second culture of ‘North Korea’ has been a relatively
small handful of North Korean defectors, mostly based in South Korea, whose deputatization
by US power to speak on behalf of a ‘democratized’ North Korea, as signaled by their ready
reception on Capitol Hill, represents a deterritorializing thrust against actual North Korean
state authority.” Song and Hong 2014, 41.
41 Some examples include Iran, Cuba, and China. 42 Risse and Sikkink 1999, 19–33.
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behavior. Some regimes may appear to be stuck in a particular phase or in-
between phases (such as denial and tactical concessions) for a long period.
Or states may be operating inmultiple phases simultaneously, which appears
to be true in the case of North Korea.43More recent work by the same authors
in The Persistent Power of Human Rights recognizes some of the limitations
of the original model.44 As contributors to Persistent Power note, the model
fails in its capacity to understand why human rights change does not occur in
the worst cases, since “few states with a previous record of gross and systema-
tic human rights violations have transgressed through stages four and five of
the model.”45 More than a decade after the publication of the spiral model,
its authors thus shift their focus to these latter phases – the move from
commitment to compliance – and seek to identify the scope conditions
that determine whether or not human rights change will occur.46 Persistent
Power’s focus on the model’s latter stages is justified. While the model’s
understanding of the earlier stages of human rights change are largely
borne out in the empirical research that has since emerged, the latter stages
require further specification.
The spiral model helps evaluate where North Korea currently stands in
regards to its evolution in human rights thinking. It also serves as a barometer
for examining the efficacy of advocacy networks to date in changing human
rights behavior. Slight shifts in North Korean behavior, however minimal, do
correspond to the early stages of the spiral model. Although the North Korean
regime remains recalcitrant – often in a state of denial, as highlighted by
Sandra Fahy in Chapter 10 – naming-and-shaming and ongoing international
pressure also seems to have resulted in tactical concessions. As a signatory of six
international human rights conventions,47 the regime has “felt obliged at
different times to report to the UN” changes it has made in its domestic
laws.48 Examples include limited reforms on laws pertaining to children and
43 As such, the model should be taken as an ideal-type heuristic for thinking about human rights
change, not a specific plan of action for any particular advocacy movement.
44 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013.
45 Jetschke and Liese 2013, 37. Stages four and five refer to prescriptive status and rule-consistent
behavior.
46 Risse and Ropp 2013, 5, 16–22.
47 These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights; the Convention of the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child
pornography.
48 Cohen 2012.
Adaptive Activism 15
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108589543.003
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Deakin University, Australia (Books), on 01 Nov 2018 at 04:26:57, subject to the Cambridge
people with disabilities, as well as revisions to its Criminal Code and Criminal
Procedures Code shortening pretrial detention and restricting night time
interrogations.49 In December 2016, North Korea ratified the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a treaty it had signed
in 2013, and in May 2017 facilitated a visit to the country by the UN’s Special
Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities.50North Korea is far from
norms-compliant, but the evidence presented in this volume suggests that
ongoing international pressure has at least prodded the regime to make
concessions at the margin as outlined in the spiral model, even as it continues
to deny human rights abuses and repress its people.
Consistent with Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s own reflection and criticism of
the spiral model, much of the work of the North Korean human rights
advocacy network is confined to the early stages of human rights change,
even as transnational actors continue to seek ways to bring more fundamental
change to North Korea. For example, the COI report relies on international
law mechanisms bringing about human rights change by drawing North
Korea closer into the international community. This approach, however, is
itself rife with contradiction. Can threats of bringing those responsible for
North Korean abuses to account be reconciled with other recommendations
within the COI report, which argue that human rights change in North Korea
relies on greater engagement with the state and its people? As Goedde dis-
cusses in detail in Chapter 7, this is the core challenge the UN faces in its
efforts to bring about change in North Korea.
Outside these efforts, regime destabilizing strategies have a great deal of
prominence among some network members. While regime type is considered
as a scope condition in the models (the more democratic a state is, the more
likely change will occur), few studies have investigated the degree to which
destabilization of an authoritarian regime might be adopted as a human rights
tactic.51 Human rights and international relations scholars have paid increas-
ing attention to issues of compliance – that is, the degree to which states
actually adhere to human rights norms. This is particularly true of the spiral
model and its emphasis on the behavior and actions of the offending state.
However, a focus on regime accountability and compliance as an observable
indicator of change unintentionally biases our understanding of transnational
advocacy networks and the strategies they use to promote change. Beyond
49 UN Human Rights Council 2009.
50 McDonald 2016; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017.
51 Exceptions include scholars who examine the ways in which states use human rights as
a political tool of domination, or as pretext for interventions and regime change. See
Bricmont 2006; Perugini and Gordon 2015.
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legal measures and policy shifts, less frequently observed are the bottom-up
mechanisms of change pursued by transnational advocacy networks which
eschew issues of compliance and accountability. Frustrated with the slow pace
of change, some activists in the North Korean human rights movement have
pushed for a more direct, interventionist approach to human rights advocacy.
Jieun Baek’s contribution in Chapter 11 is particularly thought-provoking in
this regard, as she unveils activist strategies to deliver information about the
outside world directly to ordinary North Koreans to undermine the regime’s
legitimacy. The North Korean case, therefore, sheds light on alternative
strategies to human rights change that may be specific to activism targeted at
totalitarian societies.
The last ten years have seen a proliferation of both quantitative and quali-
tative studies of human rights change.52 Importantly, many of these focus on
international law mechanisms. What we learn from these studies about the
potential for human rights change in “hard case” authoritarian contexts such
as North Korea, where there is no evident popular mobilization, does not bode
well for the next stages of the North Korean human rights movement. Indeed,
North Korea seems stuck in a loop between stages of denial and tactical
concessions. Additionally, empirical research into human rights change in
such contexts suggests that further change without local support is unlikely.
As discussed earlier, the spiral model of human rights change relies on
domestic support. Risse and Ropp go so far as to suggest that democratic
governance seems to be a prerequisite for human rights change.53 Without
institutions of accountability, the social mechanisms central to effective
activism – naming-and-shaming, persuasion and learning, and legal enforce-
ment – are absent. Simply put, autocratic regimes cannot be “[shamed] into
compliance.”54 As Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz argue, the importance of an
educated public explains the resources human rights organizations put into
human rights education: “domestic support is critical in limiting how the state
can respond to human rights criticism.”55 Hafner-Burton, in her systematic
survey of human rights change, contends that participation in the interna-
tional human rights legal system only leads to greater human rights protection
in contexts where institutions for accountability exist domestically.
Furthermore, she argues that once initial progress has been made on the
international stage, localization of the transnational movement is essential
for bringing about substantive change.56 The question is whether the North
52 Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009. 53 Risse and Ropp 2013, 16–17.
54 Risse and Ropp 2013, 17. 55 Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz 2012, 209.
56 Hafner-Burton 2013, 155–9.
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Korean human rights network – as fragmented as it is, and lacking a domestic
support base – can still bring about meaningful human rights change inside
North Korea.
In defense of international law mechanisms, Simmons marshals evidence
suggesting that formal treaty commitments do seem to impel governments
toward better human rights practice as the signing of such treaties generally
signals serious intent.57 Is this the case for North Korea? In her examination of
North Korea’s behavior at the UN, Hosaniak, in Chapter 6 of this volume,
argues that rather than signaling a serious commitment toward human rights,
North Korea’s accession to these treaties were politically motivated – North
Korea desired greater inclusion in the international community at the time of
signing, especially vis-a`-vis South Korea – and the government likely did not
appreciate that it would be brought to account on these commitments. In fact,
in an effort to avoid referral to the International Criminal Court, Naryan in
Chapter 5 reveals that North Korean diplomats met with the UN Special
Rapporteur and traveled to Europe to meet with the EU Special
Representative on Human Rights. Indeed, Simmons’ arguments regarding
the value of treaty commitment revolve around the value of this action to
affect domestic politics in fluid settings. North Korea is, decisively, not a fluid
environment and, as Simmons herself notes, in settings such as stable auto-
cracies, the likelihood of political mobilization to demand compliance is
unlikely if such demands are seen as a challenge to the regime’s governance
structures.58
North Korean human rights activism has achieved unlikely success to date.
Can it continue to defy expectations and achieve meaningful change on
behalf of the North Korean people? Baek in Chapter 11 and Goedde in
Chapter 7 suggest two alternative but complementary paths moving forward.
Baek examines attempts by human rights activists to infiltrate the North
Korean government’s information blockade, arguing that these direct action
efforts have the potential to meet what seems to be a growing desire, on the
part of the North Korean people, to learn more about the outside world and
North Korea’s place within it. Goedde suggests that the international legal
approach should be more attuned to contextual variables, arguing that
reframing the human rights narrative at the UN to better incorporate North
Korean understandings of rights and obligations could go a long way toward
resolving the existing tension between accountability and engagement.
Goedde links reframing efforts to “direct” information campaigns, suggesting
that a greater appreciation of how North Koreans think and talk about rights
57 Simmons 2009, 4. 58 Simmons 2009, 15.
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could lead to the development of more effective information packages aimed
at local people, arming North Korean human rights activists with a much
more potent human rights weapon.
The two-pronged approach to transnational advocacy enabled by the
coexistence of different cleavages within the North Korean human rights
network reflects the realities observed by contributors to this volume: that
competing approaches to human rights activism can complement each
other. This lends itself to a modified understanding of the boomerang and
spiral models when adapted to highly repressive states. Figure 1.1 illustrates
this dynamic.
Building on the boomerang and spiral models for understanding North
Korean human rights activism, the transnational advocacy network targets the
repressive state, naming and shaming the rights-violating regime and calling
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figure 1.1 Mechanisms for change in North Korean human rights
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for accountability. However, in the absence of domestic partners, some actors,
particularly IGOs such as the UN or major INGOs, are more inclined to rely
heavily on legal mechanisms, emphasizing accountability and compliance
and threatening sanctions. In this top-down approach to human rights advo-
cacy, the regime becomes the primary focal point. There is an expectation or
hope that the rights-violating governmentmight implement reforms leading to
gradual policy shifts and an eventual transformation in human rights.
Other human rights actors, more often at the grassroots end, take a more
subversive, “hands-on” approach, directing their advocacy toward society at
large. Such actors place little faith in recalcitrant regimes such as North Korea
that they will make any meaningful human rights change in the future. They
therefore direct their energies in promoting defections and cultivating informa-
tion networks in the hopes of undermining the legitimacy of the regime and its
grip over the people. In theNorth Korean case, this has included activists sending
information about the outside world in the form of news broadcasts, South
Korean dramas, Western movies, and through market activity and exchange.
Defectors and the NGOs which support them, as well as agents outside of the
human rights network such as profit-motivated brokers, corrupt border guards,
and rent-seeking local officials, serve as an important conduit in ensuring the flow
of information between human rights actors and ordinary North Koreans. In the
absence of North Korean civil society, the advocacy network is essentially culti-
vating their own local allies, thus sowing the seeds for domestic dissent. If change
cannot occur from the top, it might as well come from below.
It is important to note that these alternative pathways to change are pro-
moted in tandem by the broader North Korean human rights advocacy net-
work. Different factions within the network have thus far been willing to work
together, and organizations central to the network, such as the Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea, have tended to straddle, and thus bridge,
different groups. Our research cannot yet tell us whether either of these
approaches might prove effective. The likelihood of change in such
a repressive context seems low given what we know about how human rights
change occurs. However, the capacity North Korean human rights activists
have shown for adaptation and coordination in the face of a highly fragmented
movement has worked to the advantage of the movement so far.
CONCLUSION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE
As demonstrated by our contributors, and contrary to existing transnational
advocacy models, the presence of a local civil society may not, in fact, be
a necessary condition for the creation of a powerful advocacymovement or the
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acquisition of international attention and legitimacy. The strategic acumen
shown by a number of key actors across the political spectrum has enabled the
development of defector voices alongside the cooperation of international
legal bodies. While the role that defectors play in the movement is not without
controversy – a matter addressed by Jay Song in Chapter 9 – North Korean
human rights activism is unlikely to be where it is today were it not for the
inclusion of defectors’ discourses. We do not see our argument, or the case of
North Korean human rights activism, necessarily undermining the explana-
tory value of either the boomerang or spiral models. Rather, the inclusion of
the North Korean case within the existing body of scholarship on transnational
human rights advocacy increases our knowledge of how nonstate actors might
seek to overcome the structural hurdles placed in their paths by powerful
authoritarian states.
The North Korean human rights movement has not developed as a cohesive
whole, and thus lends itself to an edited volume of this kind. Activists in South
Korea, Japan, the United States, and Europe come to the issue of North
Korean human rights from diverse historical, political, and ideological per-
spectives. In each chapter, country and regional experts consider the evolution
of the movement in a variety of domestic and transnational settings.
To understand the movement, we believe it is first important to disaggregate
it and consider it in its parts before viewing the movement as a whole.
Methodologically, our contributors raise the bar for scholarship on North
Korea and transnational advocacy networks, employing a variety of analytical
tools (including computer-assisted content analysis, discourse analysis,
Internet hyperlink analysis, network analysis, and case study methods) to
shed new light on North Korean human rights activism. Several chapters
present new empirical data to indicate why North Korean human rights
activism has evolved along its current trajectory and how this has shaped
movement and policy outcomes to date. All contributors rely on primary
sources, first-hand accounts, and/or original language sources. Several authors
have systematically compiled and analyzed large amounts of textual data from
media accounts, official statements, and NGO and government reports for this
project.
Following this opening chapter, Part I explores North Korean human rights
activism and discourse within different national contexts. We begin with the
South Korean context: Reidhead, in Chapter 2, delves into the complex
political terrain that North Korean human rights activists must traverse.
In Seoul, the issue of human rights in North Korea is closely intertwined
with questions of reunification, and has its roots deep in South Korea’s own
authoritarian past where the country’s domestic civil society movement
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originates. Against this backdrop, then, human rights activists from both the
progressive and the conservative end of the political spectrum must vie for
legitimacy. Reidhead conducts a large corpus analysis of media content in
South Korean newspapers to trace North Korean human rights discourse and
the rising dominance of groups oriented toward civil and political rights in
South Korea.
In Chapter 3, Yeo finds some parallels with Reidhead’s analysis in his study
of North Korean human rights activism in the United States. As Yeo explains,
North Korean human rights activism cannot escape its historical precedents.
The issue of North Korean human rights is deeply embedded in a Cold War
normative framework, shaped by human rights discourse that dates back to
foreign policy debates from the 1970s. As such, North Korean human rights
advocacy in the United States tends to adopt a stronger security emphasis than
elsewhere through the adoption of a human rights–security nexus framing.
While North Korean human rights discourse and advocacy in the United
States and South Korea is shaped by a complex and historically normative
framework, Japanese discourse has been more narrowly focused on the abduc-
tion of Japanese nationals by Pyongyang in the 1970s and 1980s. In Chapter 4,
Arrington investigates how and why the abductions issue has become so
inextricably linked to the North Korean human rights issue by scrutinizing
the groups and individuals engaged in normative contestation about the
framing of the abductions issue as a human rights one. She finds that while
the dualism of North Korean human rights discourse in Japan has at times
complicated Japanese participation and integration into the North Korean
human rights transnational advocacy network, rendering the abductions as
a North Korean human rights problem has also advanced the human rights
discourse, both inside Japan and transnationally.
In Chapter 5, Narayan, a former Amnesty researcher based in London,
discusses North Korean human rights discourse and activism in the European
context. Naryan explores the relationships between European civil society
organizations and the formal institutional channels in Europe under which
North Korean human rights advocacy unfolds. How North Korean human
rights advocacy operates in Europe is somewhat unique given the EU’s active
role in promoting North Korean human rights, both through direct talks with
North Korea and through multilateral channels, and due to the fact that
several European states maintain formal diplomatic ties with North Korea.
In Part II, the volume transitions from domestic to transnational perspec-
tives. The three chapters in this section consider how actors – coming to the
issue from diverse backgrounds and national contexts – seek to develop
coherent transnational networks to address the North Korean human rights
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issue. Here, our focus of analysis shifts to the politics of agenda-setting. Rather
than focusing on discursive frame development, the authors spend time
unraveling the factors which affect normative contestation within networks:
discursive frames, network dynamics, and power relations. In the domestic
arena, contentious discursive frames are shaped by norms and ideas specific to
each context. In the transnational arena, normative contestation between
activists has led to a diverse set of agenda-setting outcomes. The authors in
this section discuss some of the consequences of the transnationalization of an
issue as highly politicized as North Korean human rights. Hosaniak com-
mences this section in Chapter 6 by offering a practitioner’s perspective.
Hosaniak’s organization – Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human
Rights – is the oldest North Korean human rights NGO and has undergone
profound normative, discursive, and political shifts over the course of its 20-
year history. Her chapter traces the trajectory of this activism, highlighting the
interaction between political context, strategy choice, and networking tactics,
with a particular focus on the strategies that led to the establishment of the
COI.59
Following Hosaniak’s activist-oriented narrative of the path toward the
COI, Goedde in Chapter 7 uncovers the mechanics and micro-processes of
this type of transnational legal mobilization. She looks specifically at the
reaction of North Korea to the accountability paradigm and argues that this
approach has periodically led to retrenchment rather than progress. Given the
logical outcome of the legal accountability approach – termination of the
North Korean regime – she argues that a greater focus on engaging North
Korean actors on issues around transnational legal norms will lead to more
productive and effective outcomes for the movement. Finally, in Chapter 8,
Chubb pulls together the findings of the previous chapters on domestic and
transnational mobilization by looking specifically at network dynamics and
considering the ramifications for theory. This chapter asks how and why the
normative and discursive contours of activist networks shift over time and
examines what the implications of this have been for campaign outcomes.
In Part III of the volume, we bring North Korean voices back into the
conversation. In Chapter 9, Song explores the role that defector-activists have
played in affecting the discursive trajectory of the North Korean human rights
campaign. While previous chapters touch on the important role that defector
59 Joanna Hosaniak is also a human rights scholar, whose research explores questions of transi-
tional justice in postcommunist states. In this volume, however, Hosaniak’s observations are
based largely on her lengthy experience as a North Korean human rights strategist and activist.
She is currently the Deputy Director General of Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human
Rights.
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voices have played in a range of contexts, Song conducts a network analysis
around five high-profile defector-activists to provide a critical analysis of the
substantive role that defector voices have played in the evolution of the North
Korean human rights movement.
Complementing Song’s chapter, the next empirical chapter shifts from the
voice of human rights victims to that of the perpetrator. This, of course, is the
North Korean state, the object and target of the transnational advocacy move-
ment. In Chapter 10, Fahy wades through thousands of pages of texts of the
North Korean newspaper Rodong Sinmun to systematically examine North
Korean responses to accusations of human rights abuse and the findings of the
COI in particular. Contrary to popular belief that the regime simply dismisses
the validity of such international forums out of hand, Fahy’s discursive analysis
of North Korean official responses demonstrates the regime’s level of engage-
ment with the issues and their efforts to deflect human rights accusations
through different means, including the creation of an “ersatz civil society.”
Finally, in Chapter 11, Baek begins to explore the possibility of change
within North Korea and the role transnational advocacy networks play in
promoting greater information flows about the outside world into North
Korea. Baek draws particular attention to the idea of information networks
and draws out the mechanisms in which activists and defectors penetrate (or
bypass) the state to reach out to ordinary North Koreans by disseminating
information through USBs, leaflets, DVDs, radio broadcasts, or through
market activity between North Korea and China.
In the volume’s concluding chapter, Yeo and Chubb come back to the
book’s central questions: how can we understand the evolution of the North
Korean human rights advocacy network and what does this mean for grap-
pling better with the question of human rights change in “hard case”
authoritarian states? The North Korean human rights movement is
a deeply fractured one that has nonetheless achieved some remarkable
milestones. By peering inside and taking its component subnetworks apart
at the domestic level, the political and moral motivations of actors and their
agendas become evident. This further advances our understanding of how
principled actors bring about change in contentious settings. The wall separ-
ating North Korea and its people from the outside world has long seemed an
insurmountable one, yet thanks to the relentless efforts of the diverse network
of individuals working on the issue of North Korean human rights around
the globe, cracks are starting to show.
As the contributors to this volume reveal, the focus on accountability
mechanisms central to the COI report is not shared by all North Korean
human rights activist groups, with some groups preferring more subversive
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methods of addressing human rights change. While the COI report’s findings
have been embraced by activists across the movement’s spectrum, the lack of
a central cohesive message at the core of the North Korean human rights
network may prove significant in the next phase of the campaign. Having set
the international agenda for North Korean human rights, attention will
necessarily shift to questions of human rights change on the ground.
The reluctance of some actors in the human rights movement to achieve
change through the frame of accountability, preferring instead to take a more
direct, interventionist approach, is likely to persist. Whether these cleavages
facilitate or hinder human rights change remains to be seen.
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